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10.1 Introduction
There is now an immense body of literature on how globalization aﬀects
labor markets. Early research centered on the United States (Freeman
1995; Richardson 1995), motivated in part by an interest in understanding
what caused marked changes in the U.S. wage structure during the 1980s
and 1990s (Katz and Autor 1999). A common theme in this work is that
globalization—especially in the form of global outsourcing—has mod-
estly but signiﬁcantly contributed to increases in wage diﬀerentials be-
tween more- and less-skilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson 1999, 2003). A
small eﬀect for international trade is perhaps unsurprising, given the large
size of the U.S. economy and the still limited role that trade plays in U.S.
production and consumption (Feenstra 1998; Freeman 2003). Later re-
search shifted attention to other countries and to the developing world in
particular, which in the 1980s began to lower barriers to trade and capital
ﬂows aggressively. The tendency for rising wage inequality to follow glob-
alization is not limited to the United States or other rich countries. Ex-
panding trade and capital ﬂows have been associated with increases in the
relative demand for skilled labor in many economies, including Chile
(Pavcnik 2003), Colombia (Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik 2004),
Hong Kong (Hsieh and Woo 2005), Mexico (Feenstra and Hanson 1997),
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excellent research assistance.and Morocco (Currie and Harrison 1997), to list just a few recent ex-
amples.1
In most research to date, the focus has been on the relationship between
globalization and earnings inequality. Fewer studies have examined how
globalization aﬀects income levels. This comes as something of a surprise,
given the long-standing interest of developing-country research in how
changes in policy aﬀect the well-being of the poor. The relative lack of at-
tention on the impact of globalization on poverty is perhaps partly attrib-
utable to methodology. The most established empirical techniques for
identifying the eﬀects of economic shocks, such as globalization or tech-
nological change, on earnings relate to estimating changes in the relative
demand for labor of diﬀerent skill types (Katz and Autor 1999). The lack
of attention may also reﬂect a U.S. bias in the type of questions being
asked. The strong emphasis in U.S. literature on why earnings inequality
has increased may have spilled over into research on other countries, par-
tially crowding out other issues.
In this paper, I examine how the distribution of income changed in Mex-
ico during the country’s decade of globalization in the 1990s. Taking the
income distribution as the unit of analysis makes it possible to examine
changes both in the nature of inequality—reﬂected in the shape of the dis-
tribution—and in the level of income—reﬂected in the position of the dis-
tribution. Mexico is worthy of study because over the last two decades the
country has aggressively opened its economy to the rest of the world. This
process began with a unilateral liberalization of trade in 1985, continued
with the elimination of many restrictions on foreign capital in 1989, and
culminated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
1994 (Hanson 2004).2
There is relatively little work on the impact of trade liberalization on
poverty in Mexico. One notable exception is Nicita (2004), who applies
data from the Mexico’s National Survey of Household Income and Ex-
penditure to techniques developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and
Porto (2003) to construct an estimate of how tariﬀreductions have aﬀected
household welfare. This exercise involves estimating the impact of tariﬀ
changes on domestic goods’ prices, the impact of changes in goods’ prices
on the wages of diﬀerent skill groups, and income and price elasticities of
demand for diﬀerent goods, and then combining these estimates to form an
estimate of the change in real income due to tariﬀs. During the 1990s, tariﬀ
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1. See Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) for sur-
veys of the literature on globalization and income in developing countries.
2. See Chiquiar (2003) for a discussion of recent policy changes in Mexico. For other work
on the labor market implications of globalization in Mexico, see Ariola and Juhn (2003),
Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Fairris (2003), Feliciano (2001), Revenga (1997), Hanson and
Harrison (1999), and Robertson (2004). See Hanson (2004) for a review of this literature. For
work on trade reform and wage inequality in Latin America, see Behrman, Birdsall, and
Szekely (2003).changes appeared to raise disposable income for all households, with
richer households enjoying a 6 percent increase and poorer households en-
joying a 2 percent increase. These income gains imply a 3 percent reduc-
tion in the number of households in poverty. Income gains are larger in re-
gions that are close to the United States, where tariﬀ-induced price changes
are larger.
The approach in Nicita (2004) exploits cross-time variation in tariﬀ lev-
els to estimate how tariﬀ changes are passed along into prices. The advan-
tage of this approach is that it produces estimates of how changes in trade
policy aﬀect the levelof real household income. One disadvantage is that it
ignores other contemporaneous shocks that are also related to globaliza-
tion, such as greater foreign investment and expanding global production
networks in Mexico. The existence of other shocks reﬂects a common prob-
lem in evaluating the impact of trade liberalization. Trade reform is not a
random event, but instead typically results as part of a government reac-
tion to economic pressures that force it to abandon a preexisting set of poli-
cies. In Mexico, as in many other countries, when the government lowered
import tariﬀs it also eliminated nontariﬀbarriers, eased restrictions on for-
eign investment, deregulated industries, and privatized state-owned enter-
prises and agricultural cooperatives. Problematically, industries subject to
larger reductions in tariﬀs may also have been subject to larger changes in
other policies. Unless one carefully controls for these other policy changes—
which is diﬃcult to do given that many of the policy instruments being
changed are either unobserved (e.g., the bureaucratic process for approv-
ing foreign direct investment) or hard to measure (e.g., nontariﬀ barri-
ers)—then one may misattribute income changes to import tariﬀs that are
in fact associated with other policy shocks.
In this paper, I compare changes in the distribution of labor income in
the 1990s between Mexican regions that were more or less exposed to glob-
alization. As section 10.2 discusses, geographic variations in proximity to
the United States and in natural resource supplies have helped make some
Mexican regions much more exposed to foreign trade and investment than
others. I take states with high exposure to globalization to be the treatment
group and states with low exposure to globalization to be the control group
(leaving states with intermediate exposure out of the analysis). I then
apply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy by comparing the change in the
income distribution for high-exposure states to the change in income dis-
tribution for low-exposure states.3 By comparing changes in the lower tail
of the distributions across regions, I am able to measure the diﬀerential
change in poverty across regions during Mexico’s globalization decade
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3. Implicit in the analysis is the assumption is that labor is suﬃciently immobile across re-
gions of Mexico for region-speciﬁc labor-demand shocks to aﬀect regional diﬀerentials in la-
bor income.(subject to a common national shock in both regions). To provide a bench-
mark for comparing poverty levels, I deﬁne the poverty threshold as the la-
bor income needed to sustain a family of four at minimum consumption
levels.4
The advantage of my approach relative to Nicita (2004), Porto (2003),
and other work in the tradition of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) is that I
am able to consider a broader set of shocks related to globalization. The
disadvantage of my approach is that I can only make statements about the
relativeregional change in poverty associated with globalization. Given the
severe estimation problems in identifying the impact of trade reform on
household income, no single approach is likely to be entirely satisfactory.
My approach and that of Nicita (2004) should thus be seen as comple-
mentary.
The analysis is complicated by several issues, three of which stand out.
One is that income distributions change both because the characteristics of
the underlying population of individuals change and because the returns
to these characteristics change. To identify the eﬀects of globalization, I
would like to examine changes in returns to characteristics (in my case, in-
terregional diﬀerences in these changes) while holding the distribution of
characteristics constant. To perform this exercise, I apply nonparametric
techniques from DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Leibbrandt,
Levinsohn, and McCrary (2005), which I describe in section 10.3. I also
compare results from this approach to results from a more standard para-
metric approach, both of which are presented in section 10.4. A second is-
sue is that other shocks in the 1990s may also have had diﬀerential eﬀects
on regions with high versus low exposure to globalization. The potential
for these shocks to contaminate the analysis is an important concern,
which I address by way of discussing qualiﬁcations to my results in section
10.5.
A third issue has to do with measurement. There are many components
to income, including labor earnings, capital returns, rental income, gov-
ernment transfers, gifts, and remittances from family members abroad.
Surveys that measure each of these components carefully, such as Mex-
ico’s National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure, are not rep-
resentative across the regions of the country (Cortés et al. 2003), which
makes it impossible to apply my estimation strategy to these data. Surveys
that are representative across Mexico’s regions, such as the Census of Pop-
ulation and Housing, measure labor income with relatively high preci-
sion, but lack complete data on other income categories. To ensure that
my data are regionally representative, I use the Mexican census, and to
minimize the impact of measurement error, I focus the analysis on labor
income. Excluding other sources of income has the obvious drawback of
420 Gordon H. Hanson
4. Since I estimate the shape of the entire distribution, other thresholds are straightforward
to consider.limiting the analysis to labor earnings rather than to the full distribution
of income.5
To preview the results, states with high exposure to globalization began
the 1990s with higher incomes than low-exposure states, even after con-
trolling for regional diﬀerences in the observable characteristics of indi-
viduals. During the 1990s, low-exposure states had slower growth in labor
income than high-exposure states. This took the form of a leftward shift in
the income distribution of low-exposure states relative to high-exposure
states. The results of this income shift were (1) a decrease in average labor
earnings of 10 percent for individuals from states with low exposure to
globalization relative to individuals from states with high exposure to glob-
alization, and (2) an increase in the incidence of wage poverty (the fraction
of wage earners whose labor income would not sustain a family of four at
above-poverty consumption levels) in low-exposure states of 7 percent rel-
ative to that in high-exposure states.
10.2 Regional Exposure to Globalization
10.2.1 Data Sources
Data for the analysis come from two sources. In 1990, I use the 1 percent
microsample of the XII Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 1990, and
in 2000 I use a 10 percent random sample of the 10 percent microsample
of the XIII Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 2000. The sample is
working-age men with positive labor earnings. I focus on men, since labor
force participation rates for women are low and vary considerably over
time, ranging from 21 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 2000. This creates is-
sues of sample selection associated with who supplies labor outside the
home. Compounding the problem, many women who report zero labor
earnings may work in the family business or on the family farm. For men,
problems of sample selection and measurement error also exist, but they
appear to be less severe. Their labor force participation rates vary less over
time, rising modestly from 73 percent in 1990 to 74 percent in 2000. Still,
diﬀerences in labor force participation over time and across regions could
aﬀect the results reported in section 10.4. In section 10.3, I discuss strate-
gies to correct for self-selection into the labor force.
10.2.2 The Opening of Mexico’s Economy
In Mexico, the last two decades have not been a quiet period. Since 1980,
the country has had three currency crises, bouts of high inﬂation, and sev-
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5. One interesting extension to the analysis in this paper would be to use Mexico’s National
Survey of Household Income and Expenditure to estimate the empirical relationship between
labor income and poverty. One could then use this mapping to evaluate how the changes in la-
bor income that I estimate (using data from the Census of Population and Housing) may have
aﬀected poverty.eral severe macroeconomic contractions, the most recent of which oc-
curred in 1995 following a large devaluation of the peso that precipitated
the country’s conversion from a ﬁxed to a ﬂoating exchange rate. The lib-
eralization of the country’s trade and investment policies has been, in part,
a response to this turmoil. Mexico’s currency crises and ensuing contrac-
tions have had very negative consequences on the country’s poor. Table
10.1 shows that poverty rates rose sharply after the 1995 peso crisis.
Mexico’s economic opening began in 1982, when the government re-
sponded to a severe balance-of-payments crisis by easing restrictions on
export assembly plants known as maquiladoras.In 1985, Mexico joined the
General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), which entailed cutting
tariﬀs and eliminating many nontariﬀ barriers. In 1989, Mexico eased re-
strictions on the rights of foreigners to own assets in the country. In 1994,
NAFTA consolidated and extended these reforms. Partly as a result of
these policy changes, the share of international trade in Mexico’s gross do-
mestic product (GDP) has nearly tripled, rising from 11 percent in 1980 to
32 percent in 2002. Mexico is now as closely tied to the U.S. economy as it
has been at any point in its history. In 2002, the country sent 89 percent of
its exports to and bought 73 percent of its imports from the United States.6
Mexico’s maquiladoras, shown in ﬁgure 10.1, have been instrumental in
the country’s export conversion. Between 1983 and 2002, real value added
in maquiladoras grew at an average annual rate of 11 percent, making it the
most dynamic sector in the country. In 2002, these export assembly plants
accounted for 45 percent of Mexico’s manufacturing exports and 28 per-
cent of the country’s manufacturing employment (up from 4 percent in
1980). Their concentration in northern Mexico accounts in part for the dif-
ferential regional impact of globalization in the country. A brief history of
Mexico’s trade policy reveals the origins of northern Mexico’s advantage
in export production.
In the 1940s, Mexico adopted a strategy of import substitution industri-
alization. To import most manufacturing products, ﬁrms had to obtain a
license from the government and pay moderate to high tariﬀs. In 1965,
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Table 10.1 Percent of Mexico’s population with per capita income below threshold
needed to achieve minimum caloric intake
Area 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Urban households 10.2 7.2 20.1 16.4 9.8
Rural households 29.5 30 43.3 43.8 34.1
Source: Cortés et al. (2003).
6. Concomitant with its economic opening, Mexico privatized state-owned enterprises,
deregulated entry restrictions in many industries, and used wage and price restraints to com-
bat inﬂation.Mexico softened its import substitution strategy by allowing the creation
of maquiladoras (Hansen 1981).7 Firms could import free of duty the in-
puts, machinery, and parts needed for export assembly operations, as long
as they exported all output. To ensure that ﬁrms abided by this rule, they
were required to buy a bond equal to the value of their imports that would
be returned to them once they had exported all their imported inputs in the
form of ﬁnal goods (hence the term in-bond assembly plants). In contrast to
other ﬁrms in the country, maquiladoras could be 100 percent foreign
owned. Bureaucratic restrictions on maquiladoras kept the sector small
until 1982, when the government streamlined regulation of the plants.
Initially, maquiladoras were required to locate within twenty miles of an
international border or coastline. In 1972, the government relaxed these
rules and allowed maquiladoras to locate throughout the country. How-
ever, the plants continued to concentrate near the United States. As seen in
ﬁgure 10.2, 83 percent of maquiladora employment is still located in states
on the U.S. border. Proximity to the U.S. market is motivated in part by a
desire to be near U.S. consumers, to whom maquiladoras export most of
their production, and in part by a desire to be near U.S. ﬁrms, who often
manage Mexican maquiladoras out of oﬃces based in U.S. border cities.
U.S. trade policies initially gave maquiladoras an advantage over other
Mexican producers in exporting to the U.S. market. Prior to NAFTA, a
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Fig. 10.1 Employment and value added in Mexico’s maquiladoras
7. The original motivation for this program was to create employment opportunities for
Mexican workers returning to the country after working in the United States as temporary
farm laborers under the Bracero Program. The U.S. government ended the Bracero Program
in 1964, and the Mexican government was concerned that the returning workers would raise
unemployment in border states.U.S. ﬁrm that made components, shipped them to a plant in Mexico for as-
sembly, and then reimported the ﬁnished good only paid U.S. import du-
ties on the value of Mexican labor and raw materials used in assembly.
NAFTA ended this special status for maquiladoras by giving all Mexican
ﬁrms duty-free access to the U.S. market.8 Yet, as seen in ﬁgure 10.1,
NAFTA did little to stunt the growth of maquiladoras. In a purely legalis-
tic sense, NAFTA did mean the end of the maquiladora regime; it elimi-
nated the in-bond arrangement under which maquiladoras operated.
However, Mexico’s low wages continue to give the country a comparative
advantage in the assembly of manufactured goods for the U.S. economy.
10.2.3 Regional Exposure to Globalization
Mexico’s trade and investment reforms have dramatically increased the
openness of its economy. These policies appear to have aﬀected some parts
of the country much more than others. Figure 10.3 plots the share of state
GDP accounted for by value added in maquiladoras during the 1990s
against distance to the United States. For three of the six states that bor-
der the United States (Baja California, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas), the
maquiladora share of GDP is over 18 percent. For two of the three others
(Coahuila, Sonora) it is over 8 percent. In the rest of the country, the
maquiladora share of GDP is below 5 percent.
While maquiladoras are a large part of Mexico’s exports, they are by no
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Fig. 10.2 Share of maquiladora employment in border states
8. With NAFTA, all ﬁrms in Mexico obtained duty-free access to the U.S. market as long
as they comply with NAFTA rules of origin. NAFTA also exposes maquiladoras to rules of
origin (from which they had been exempt previously), but now it also allows the plants to sell
goods on the Mexican market.means the whole story. Export production also occurs in states with rela-
tively large supplies of skilled labor, which have attracted multinational
auto companies (as in Aguascalientes) and electronics producers (as in
Jalisco). Figure 10.4 plots the share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in
state GDP against the share of maquiladora value added in state GDP,
both averaged over the 1990s. While border states show up as high in both
categories, other states have attracted FDI in forms besides maquiladoras.
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Fig. 10.3 Maquiladora activity in Mexico and distance to the United States
Fig. 10.4 Maquiladora activity and FDI in MexicoThese include states in which Mexico’s most important industrial cities are
located (Mexico City, Federal District; Monterrey, Nuevo Leon; Guadala-
jara, Jalisco).
Beyond FDI and maquiladoras, some states are exposed to globaliza-
tion by virtue of having ports and being large importers. This is seen in ﬁg-
ure 10.5, which plots FDI as a share of state GDP against imports as a
share of state GDP.9 A few states, such as Yucatan and Sinaloa, have high
imports while attracting little in the way of FDI.
To categorize states as having high or low exposure to globalization, I
use the three measures described in ﬁgures 10.3–10.5: the share of
maquiladora value added in state GDP, the share of FDI in state GDP, and
the share of imports in state GDP (each averaged over the period 1993–99).
Using all three measures is important, since with the exception of FDI and
imports they are relatively weakly correlated across states, as reported in
table 10.2. Table 10.3 reports the globalization measures for Mexico’s
thirty-two states, where states are sorted according to their average rank
across the three measures. I select as states with high exposure to global-
ization those whose average rank across the three measures is in the top
third (and that have at least one individual rank in the top third), and I se-
lect as states with low exposure to globalization those whose average rank
is in the bottom third (and that have no single rank in the top third).
Of the seven states with high exposure to globalization, ﬁve share a bor-
der with the United States; of the ten states with low exposure to global-
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Fig. 10.5 FDI and imports in Mexico
9. In Mexico, there are no data on exports at the state level (other than data on maquiladora
exports).ization, ﬁve are in southern Mexico. Historically, Mexico’s north—with its
more abundant mineral deposits, lower population densities, and closer
proximity to the United States—has been relatively rich, while Mexico’s
south—with its higher population densities and larger indigenous com-
munity—has been relatively poor. It is well known that since Mexico’s eco-
nomic opening the border region has enjoyed relatively high wage growth,
widening regional wage diﬀerentials in the country (Hanson 2004). How-
ever, the recent success of the border region follows a period in which Mex-
ico’s poorer regions had been catching up. Chiquiar (2005) ﬁnds that from
1970 to 1985, the ﬁfteen years preceding Mexico’s entry into the GATT,
there was convergence in per capita GDP levels across Mexican states, and
that after 1985 this process broke down. For the period 1985–2001, there is
strong divergence in state per capita GDP levels. Chiquiar’s results are re-
produced in ﬁgure 10.6. Mexico’s globalization decade thus follows a pe-
riod during which income diﬀerences between high-exposure states and
low-exposure states had been closing.
Finally, it is important to note that exposure to globalization is not
simply a proxy for the opportunity to migrate to the United States. Con-
trary to popular belief, migration to the United States is not especially
common among residents of Mexican states on the U.S. border. Mexico’s
high migration states are in agricultural regions in central and western
Mexico, which have dominated migration to the United States for most of
the last century (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001). Most of these states
have low exposure to FDI or to trade, as seen in ﬁgures 10.7 and 10.8,
which plot the fraction of the state population migrating to the United
States over the period 1995–2000 against the share of FDI in state GDP or
the share of imports in state GDP. This suggests that high exposure to glob-
alization does not indicate high exposure to emigration.
Proximity to the United States explains part of regional diﬀerences in
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Table 10.2 Correlation matrix for measures of exposure to globalization across Mexican states
in the 1990s
Maquiladora  Share of state 
value Foreign  direct  population 
added/ investment/ Imports/ migrating to 
state GDP state GDP state GDP U.S., 1995–2000
Maquiladora value added/state GDP
Foreign direct investment/state GDP 0.381
Imports/state GDP –0.008 0.582
Share of state population migrating to 
U.S., 1995–2000 –0.129 –0.371 –0.257
Notes: Shares of state GDP (maquiladora value added, foreign direct investment, imports) are averages
over the period 1993–99. Correlations are weighted by state share of the national population (averaged
over 1990 to 2000).exposure to globalization, but it is clearly not the whole story. Other states
have become more integrated into the global economy by virtue of having
more skilled workers, better transportation infrastructure, or larger mar-
kets. These features, while present before globalization took hold in Mex-
ico, are not exogenous. They reﬂect the ability of these states to develop
economically, which may in turn reﬂect the quality of their legal or politi-
cal institutions or other historical factors. This suggests that my measure
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Table 10.3 Categorizing Mexican states by exposure to globalization in the 1990s
Share of state GDP
State Average rank FDI Imports Maquiladoras
High exposure to globalization
Baja California 30 0.070 0.018 0.246
Chihuahua 28 0.030 0.018 0.214
Nuevo Leon 28 0.039 0.027 0.023
Sonora 27 0.015 0.034 0.088
Jalisco 25 0.018 0.027 0.029
Tamaulipas 25 0.035 0.013 0.181
Aguascalientes 25 0.015 0.014 0.046
Intermediate states
Federal District 22 0.055 0.058 0.000
Coahuila 22 0.011 0.014 0.077
Yucatan 21 0.005 0.023 0.031
Puebla 19 0.009 0.015 0.015
Baja California Star 19 0.032 0.011 0.008
San Luis Potosi 18 0.028 0.011 0.013
Guanajuato 18 0.009 0.014 0.008
Sinaloa 17 0.005 0.027 0.001
Tlaxcala 17 0.019 0.010 0.020
Queretaro 16 0.013 0.011 0.011
Durango 16 0.001 0.012 0.035
Tabasco 16 0.010 0.017 0.000
Morelos 15 0.024 0.010 0.005
Mexico 15 0.031 0.008 0.004
Michoacan 15 0.000 0.016 0.000
Low exposure to globalization
Zacatecas 15 0.003 0.013 0.008
Quintana Roo 12 0.006 0.011 0.000
Nayarit 10 0.006 0.011 0.000
Colima 9 0.002 0.014 0.000
Guerrero 9 0.004 0.007 0.002
Veracruz 8 –0.004 0.012 0.000
Chiapas 6 0.000 0.011 0.000
Campeche 5 0.001 0.008 0.000
Hildalgo 4 0.000 0.007 0.000
Oaxaca 2 0.000 0.005 0.000
Note:Shares of state GDP (foreign direct investment, imports, maquiladora value added) are
averages over the period 1993–99.of exposure to globalization may proxy for institutional quality or other re-
gional characteristics. Identifying the factors that determine regional vari-
ation in exposure to global markets, while beyond the scope of this paper,
is important. Without this mapping, one cannot make policy recommen-
dations. My ﬁndings will suggest that in Mexico regions more exposed to
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A
B
Fig. 10.6 Growth in log GDP across Mexican states, 1970–2001: A, annual
growth 1970–85 versus initial GDP; B, annual growth 1985–2001 versus initial
GDPglobalization have done better in terms of income growth. But the policy
implications of this result are unclear, as I leave unanswered the question
of how one goes about increasing regional exposure.
10.3 Empirical Methodology
The empirical analysis involves comparing changes in income distribu-
tion during Mexico’s globalization decade between two groups of states:
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Fig. 10.7 International migration and FDI in Mexico
Fig. 10.8 International migration and imports in Mexicostates with high exposure to globalization and states with low exposure to
globalization. In this section, I describe nonparametric and parametric ap-
proaches for making these comparisons.
10.3.1 Estimating Counterfactual Income Densities
Let f(w⏐x, i, t) be the density of labor income, w, conditional on a set of
observed characteristics, x, in region i and time t. Deﬁne h(x⏐i, t) as the
density of observed characteristics among income earners in region i and
time t. For regions, i   H indicates high exposure to globalization and i  
Lindicates low exposure to globalization; for time periods, t 00 indicates
the year 2000 and t   90 indicates the year 1990. The observed density of
labor income for individuals in i at t is
(1) g(w⏐i, t)    f(w⏐x, i, t)h(x⏐i, t)dx.
Diﬀerences in f(w⏐x, H, t) and f(w⏐x, L, t) capture diﬀerences in returns
to observable characteristics in regions with high versus low exposure to
globalization; diﬀerences in h(x⏐H, t) and h(x⏐L, t) capture diﬀerences in
the distribution of observed characteristics in high- versus low-exposure
regions.
To evaluate the change in income distributions across time and across re-
gions, I would like to compare changes in f(w⏐x, H, t) and f(w⏐x, L, t),
while holding the distribution of x constant. However, in the data I do not
observe these conditional densities, but the only marginal densities, g(w⏐x,
H, t) and g(w⏐x, L, t). To evaluate these densities, I apply techniques from
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996). First, consider the cross-time
change in income distribution in the high-exposure region that is due to
changes in returns to observable characteristics, which can be written as
(2)   f(w⏐x, H, 00)h(x⏐H, 90)dx     f(w⏐x, H, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx.
Equation (2) evaluates the change in income distribution in high-exposure
regions between 1990 and 2000, ﬁxing the marginal density of observables
to be that in high-exposure regions in 1990. Rewrite equation (2) as
(3)  ( H,90→H,00   1)f(w⏐x, H, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx,
where
(4)  H,90→H,00   .
Equation (3) is simply the observed marginal income density in high-
exposure regions in 1990, adjusted by a weighting function. Given an esti-
mate of the weighting function in equation (4), it would be straightforward
to apply a standard kernel density estimator to equation (3). The key, then,
to estimating the change in income distribution that is due to changes in re-




Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico 431Before turning to the weighting functions, consider the analog to equa-
tion (2) for regions with low exposure to globalization. The change in in-
come distribution in low-exposure regions that is due to changes in returns
to observables is
(5)   f(w⏐x, L, 00)h(x⏐H, 90)dx     f(w⏐x, L, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx.
Equation (5) evaluates the change in income distribution in regions with
low exposure to globalization between 1990 and 2000, again ﬁxing the
marginal density of observables to be that in high-exposure regions in
1990. To rewrite equation (5) in terms of the marginal density of income
in high-exposure regions in 1990, apply the weights
(6)  H,90→L,00   and  H,90→L,90   ,
which yields
(7)  [ H,90→L,00    H,90→L,90]f(w⏐x, H, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx.
As in estimating equation (3), estimating equation (7) comes down to ap-
plying the appropriate weighting function to a standard kernel density es-
timator.
The changes in conditional income densities in equations (2) and (5) reﬂect
in part the impact of globalization and in part the impact of other aggregate
shocks to the Mexican economy. The diﬀerence between these changes
amounts to a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator, which evaluates the change
in returns to observables in regions with high exposure to globalization rela-
tive to the change in returns observables in regions with low exposure to glob-
alization. Putting equations (3) and (7) together, we get the following:
(8)    f(w⏐x, H, 00)h(x⏐H, 90)dx     f(w⏐x, H, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx 
    f(w⏐x, L, 00)h(x⏐H, 90)dx     f(w⏐x, L, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx 
  [( H,90→H,00   1)   ( H,90→L,90   H,90→L,90)] f(w⏐x, H, 90)
 h(x⏐H, 90)dx
Equation (8) shows the 1990-to-2000 change in income distribution in
high-exposure regions relative to low-exposure regions, holding the distri-
bution of observables constant. I use equation (8) to evaluate the impact of
globalization on income distribution in Mexico. The choice of the high-
exposure region in 1990 as the base case is purely arbitrary and should not
aﬀect the density diﬀerence. To check the robustness of the results, I will
discuss estimates using other base cases.
To estimate the weighting functions in equations (4) and (6), I use Leib-
brandt, Levinsohn, and McCrary’s (2005) extension of the DiNardo,
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 H,90→L,00   
 
 H,90→L,90   
 
Each weighting function is the product of odds ratios. Consider the ﬁrst
weight. The ﬁrst ratio is the odds an individual is from a high-exposure re-
gion in 2000 (based on a sample of individuals from high-exposure regions
in 1990 and 2000), conditional on observables, x, and labor income, w. The
second ratio is the (inverse) odds that an individual is from a high-exposure
region in 2000 (again, based on a sample of individuals from high-exposure
regions in 1990 and 2000), conditional just on x. I can estimate the odds ra-
tios by estimating two logit models. In each case, the dependent variable is
a 0–1 variable on the outcome i   H and t   00 (based on a sample of i  
H and t   90 or 00). For the ﬁrst logit model, the regressors are x and w;
for the second, the regressor is x, alone. The other weights can be estimated
analogously.
After estimating the weights, I apply them to a standard kernel density
estimator to obtain estimates for the densities described by equations (3),
(7), and (9). These estimates are for the diﬀerencein income densities, in the
case of equations (3) and (7), and for the double diﬀerence in income densi-
ties, in the case of equation (9).
10.3.2 A Parametric Analog
The advantage of the approach described in subsection 10.3.1 is that it
characterizes the diﬀerence in income across time periods and/or regions
at all points in the distribution. The disadvantage is that there are no stan-
dard errors for these density diﬀerences. To examine the statistical signiﬁ-
cance of the results, I estimate a parametric analog to equation (8), which
is simply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence wage equation.
I pool data on working age men in 1990 and 2000 from states with either
1   Pr(t   90, i   L)⏐x)
   
Pr(t   90, i   L)⏐x)
Pr(t   90, i   L)⏐w, x)
   




1   Pr(t   00, i   L)⏐x)
   
Pr(t   00, i   L)⏐x)
Pr(t   00, i   L)⏐w, x)
   




1   Pr(t   00, i   H)⏐x)
   
Pr(t   00, i   H)⏐x)
Pr(t   00, i   H)⏐w, x)
   




Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico 433high exposure or low exposure to globalization and then estimate the fol-
lowing regression,
(10) ln whst    s   Xhst( 1    2Y2000ht    3Highhs) 
   Y2000ht   Highhs   εhst,
where w is labor market earnings, X is a vector of observed characteristics,
Y2000 is a dummy variable for the year 2000, and High is a dummy vari-
able for high-exposure states. The regression includes controls for state
ﬁxed eﬀects and allows returns to observable characteristics to vary across
regions and across time. The coeﬃcient,  , captures the diﬀerential change
in earnings from 1990 to 2000 between states with high exposure and low
exposure to globalization.
Equation (10) is a standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation, which
implies that I estimate the mean diﬀerential in wage growth between low-
exposure and high-exposure states. This approach ignores the possibility
that the wage eﬀect of being in a state with high exposure to globalization
may not be uniform throughout the wage distribution. The results pre-
sented in the next section will provide evidence consistent with this possi-
bility. A more elegant approach would be to estimate the regional diﬀeren-
tial in wage changes nonparametrically, as in the framework derived by
Athey and Imbens (2003).
10.3.3 Estimation Issues
Several estimation issues merit attention. First, individuals self-select
into regions. Individuals who have chosen to live in a state with high expo-
sure to globalization may have relatively high drive or ambition and may
have moved to the state to take advantage of the opportunities globaliza-
tion oﬀers. Similarly, individuals who have chosen not to leave states with
low exposure to globalization may have relatively low drive or ambition.
Given this pattern of selection, unobserved components of labor income
would tend to be positive for individuals in high-exposure states and nega-
tive for individuals in low-exposure states. The estimation exercises in
equations (9) and (10) would then be polluted by systematic diﬀerences in
unobserved characteristics between regions. To avoid this problem, I cate-
gorize individuals by birth state and not by state of residence. In this way,
I pick up earnings diﬀerences in where people live based on where they
were born—a factor out of their control—and not on where they have cho-
sen to reside—a factor in their control. Consistent with expectations, in
1990 83 percent of those born in high-exposure states still lived in those
states, compared to only 73 percent of those born in low-exposure states.
In 2000, the ﬁgures were 82 percent and 70 percent.
A second estimation issue is that individuals self-select into the labor
force. This is partly due to age. Over time, young workers enter the labor
434 Gordon H. Hansonforce and older workers exit. To control for these movements, I limit the
sample to the cohort of men who were twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve years old in
1990 (and thirty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve years old in 2000). Relatedly, if over the
1990s labor market conditions improved by more in high-exposure states
than in low-exposure states, high-exposure states may have registered a
larger increase in the fraction of low-ability individuals participating in the
labor force. Given this pattern of selection, unobserved components of la-
bor income may have increased by less in high-exposure states than in low-
exposure states.10 To control for selection into the labor force, I follow Lee
(2004) and trim low-wage earners across the four samples (i.e., for i   H, L
and t   90,00) such that the fraction included in the estimation is the same
for each group.
A third estimation issue is that shocks other than globalization may have
had diﬀerential impacts on regions with high versus low exposure to glob-
alization. One such shock is the peso crisis of 1995. After a bungled deval-
uation of the peso in 1994, Mexico chose to ﬂoat its currency, which pro-
ceeded to plummet in value relative to the dollar. The ensuing increase in
the peso value of dollar-denominated liabilities contributed to a banking
collapse and a severe macroeconomic contraction. It is hard to gauge
whether the peso crisis would have hurt states with high exposure to glob-
alization more or less than states with low exposure. On the one hand,
high-exposure states are more specialized in the production of exports, and
the devaluation of the peso would have increased demand for their output.
On the other hand, high-exposure states are better integrated into Mexico’s
ﬁnancial markets and the banking collapse may have hurt them more.
Other important shocks in the 1990s included a reform of Mexico’s land
tenure system in 1992, the ongoing privatization of state-owned enterprises
and deregulation of industries, and the ruling party’s loss of majority con-
trol in Mexico’s congress in 1997. Again, it is hard to say whether these
shocks would have helped or hurt high-exposure states more. The existence
of these other shocks leaves the results subject to the caveat that factors
other than globalization may have accounted for any diﬀerential change in
income distribution across regions of the country. I return to this issue in
section 10.5.
10.4 Empirical Results
The sample for the analysis is men aged twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve in 1990
or thirty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve in 2000 who were born in one of the seven Mexi-
can states with high exposure to globalization or in one of the ten Mexican
states with low exposure to globalization. The dependent variable is log av-
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10. This suggests that selection into the labor force would work against selection into re-
gions, in terms of the impact on unobserved components of earnings.erage hourly labor earnings.11 I also discuss results using log total labor in-
come as the dependent variable. Summary statistics are in table 10.4.
10.4.1 Raw Income Distributions
To provide a starting point for the analysis, consider the raw distribu-
tions of labor income in states with either high exposure or low exposure to
globalization. Figure 10.9 shows kernel density estimates for hourly labor
earnings in 1990 and 2000. In both years, the density for high-exposure
states is shifted to the right compared to low-exposure states. Between 1990
and 2000, the diﬀerence between the wage densities in the two groups of
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11. For Mexico, average hourly wages are calculated as monthly labor income   (4.5  
hours worked last week); for the United States, average hourly wages are calculated as annual
labor income   (weeks worked last year   usual hours worked per week). Assuming individ-
uals work all weeks of a month could bias wage estimates downward. To avoid measurement
error associated with implausibly low wage values or with top coding of earnings, I restrict
the sample to be individuals with hourly wages between $0.05 and $20 (in 2000 dollars). This
restriction is nearly identical to dropping the largest and smallest 0.5 percent of wage values.
Table 10.4 Summary statistics
High exposure to globalization Low exposure to globalization
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
High grade of schooling completed, 1990
Age 33.6 5.9 33.9 5.9
0 0.055 0.229 0.132 0.338
1 to 5 0.185 0.388 0.285 0.452
6 to 8 0.273 0.445 0.255 0.436
9 to 11 0.208 0.406 0.141 0.348
12 to 15 0.139 0.346 0.100 0.300
16  0.140 0.347 0.087 0.282
Wage 2.590 2.610 1.781 2.073
No. of 
observations 13,771 19,351
High grade of schooling completed, 2000
Age 43.0 5.7 43.2 5.8
0 0.036 0.187 0.093 0.290
1 to 5 0.178 0.383 0.255 0.436
6 to 8 0.259 0.438 0.259 0.438
9 to 11 0.207 0.405 0.157 0.364
12 to 15 0.142 0.349 0.109 0.312
16  0.177 0.382 0.128 0.334
Wage 2.656 2.798 1.674 1.965
No. of 
observations 11,807 17,967
Notes: Sample is men with positive labor earnings aged twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve in 1990 or
thirty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve in 2000 born in states with either high exposure to globalization or low
exposure to globalization. Wages are average hourly levels in 2000 U.S. dollars.states appears to widen. Higher wages in high-exposure states reﬂect in
part the fact these states have a more highly educated labor force, as indi-
cated by table 10.4. Higher wages in high-exposure states may also reﬂect
diﬀerences in the returns to observable characteristics across states in
Mexico.
To see what these distributional diﬀerences imply about diﬀerences in
the incidence of poverty between regions, ﬁgure 10.10 shows the cumula-
tive distribution for wages in high-exposure and low-exposure states in the
two years. The vertical line in each graph shows the hourly wage needed to
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Fig. 10.9 Density of hourly labor income in states with high exposure and low ex-
posure to globalization: A, 1990; B, 2000
A
Bprovide the minimum caloric intake for a family of four with one wage
earner working the mean number of annual labor hours in that year.12 The
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Fig. 10.10 Cumulative distribution of hourly labor income in states with high ex-
posure and low exposure to globalization: A, 1990; B, 2000
12. In 1990, the implied poverty cutoﬀ for the hourly wage was $1.16 in low-exposure re-
gions and $1.25 in high-exposure regions (in 2000 U.S. dollars), and in 2000, it was $1.13 in
low-exposure regions and $1.22 in high-exposure regions. The poverty wage is lower in low-
exposure regions because rural areas have lower prices for goods and because a higher frac-
tion of the population in low-exposure regions lives in rural areas. The line shown in ﬁgure
10.9 is that for the log poverty wage in low-exposure regions (in log terms the poverty wage in
high-exposure and low-exposure regions is nearly the same).peso value for the minimum caloric intake is from Cortés et al. (2003). The
poverty wage line in ﬁgure 10.10 is not meant to provide an accurate indi-
cator of the fraction of individuals living in poverty. By focusing on labor
income, I ignore other sources of household earnings. Government trans-
fers, rental income, loans, in-kind receipts, and remittances also supple-
ment family income, suggesting that the implied poverty wage threshold in
ﬁgure 10.10 is set too high—some families below this threshold will receive
enough income from other sources to allow them to aﬀord a consumption
level that is above the poverty cutoﬀ. Still, the poverty wage is a useful
benchmark for gauging the potential for a worker to sustain a family at
above-poverty consumption levels on labor income alone (which is two-
thirds of total income in Mexico).
In 1990, the fraction of workers earning less than the poverty cutoﬀwage
in low-exposure regions (0.42) was twice that in high-exposure regions
(0.21). In 2000, the diﬀerence was even larger, with the fraction of workers
below the poverty wage at 0.49 in low-exposure regions and 0.22 in high-
exposure regions. While it appears that poverty increased more rapidly in
low-exposure regions, the results in ﬁgure 10.10 are inconclusive. Since
both the price of labor and the composition of labor are changing across
regions and over time, we do not know whether the apparent increase in the
relative incidence of poverty in low-exposure regions is due to a deteriora-
tion in the returns to observable characteristics or to change in the relative
composition of the labor force. To separate these eﬀects, I construct coun-
terfactual income densities.
10.4.2 Counterfactual Income Distributions
To control for regional diﬀerences in the distribution of observable char-
acteristics, I apply the weights in equation (9) to the kernel density for high-
exposure states in 1990. This produces the two sets of densities in ﬁgure
10.11. Panel A shows the actual income density in 1990 for high-exposure
states and a counterfactual density that would obtain were workers in high-
exposure states in 1990 paid according to the returns to observable char-
acteristics in low-exposure states in 1990, or
  f(w⏐x, L, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx     H,90→L,90f(w⏐x, H, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx.
Since the distribution of observable characteristics is the same in the actual
and counterfactual densities, comparing the two makes it possible to iso-
late the regional diﬀerences in income densities that are attributable to re-
gional diﬀerences in returns to characteristics. In ﬁgure 10.11, the density
for high-exposure states in 1990 is again right-shifted relative to low-
exposure states, although the regional diﬀerence in incomes is smaller than
in ﬁgure 10.9. Thus, even before Mexico’s globalization decade, incomes
were higher across the distribution in high-exposure states. These income
diﬀerences may be due to high-exposure states historically having better
infrastructure, being more specialized in the high-wage manufacturing sec-
Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico 439tor, or being less specialized in the low-wage agricultural sector, among
other factors (see Chiquiar 2003 for a more complete discussion). This
highlights the importance of controlling for initial income diﬀerences be-
tween states when examining changes in income distributions over time.
Panel B of ﬁgure 10.11 shows income densities in 2000, evaluated based
on the distribution of observable characteristics in high-exposure states in
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Fig. 10.11 Counterfactual income densities, high- and low-exposure states:
A, 1990; B, 20001990. For high-exposure states, the resulting counterfactual density is what
workers in high-exposure states in 2000 would earn were they to have the
observable characteristics of workers in high-exposure states in 1990, or
  f(w⏐x, H, 00)h(x⏐H, 90)dx     H,90→H,00f(w⏐x, H, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx.
For low-exposure states, the counterfactual is what workers in low-
exposure states in 2000 would earn had they the characteristics of high-
exposure states in 1990, or
  f(w⏐x, L, 00)h(x⏐H, 90)dx     H,90→L,00f(w⏐x, H, 90)h(x⏐H, 90)dx.
Comparing these counterfactuals isolates regional diﬀerences in income
densities that are due to diﬀerences in returns to characteristics rather than
to the distribution of observables. As in 1990, the density for high-exposure
states in 2000 is right-shifted relative to low-exposure states. Comparing
the two years, it appears that diﬀerences in income densities between high-
exposure and low-exposure states have increased over time, suggesting that
relative incomes have risen in the former.
To relate the counterfactual wage densities to poverty, ﬁgure 10.12shows
the cumulative distribution analogs to the counterfactual wage kernels in
ﬁgure 10.11. Panel A of ﬁgure 10.12 thus shows the cumulative density for
wages in high-exposure and low-exposure states in 1990, based on the char-
acteristics of workers in high-exposure regions in 1990. Comparing this
graph to panel A of ﬁgure 10.10, we again see that the fraction of workers
below the poverty wage is higher in low-exposure states (0.32) than in high-
exposure states (0.21). However, the diﬀerence in the incidence of wage
poverty between the two groups of states in ﬁgure 10.12 (0.32 – 0.21  0.11)
is considerably lower than in ﬁgure 10.10 (0.42 – 0.21  0.21). Holding con-
stant the distribution of observable characteristics leaves the diﬀerence in
cumulative distributions due to diﬀerences in returns to observables.
Again, the apparent higher initial incidence of poverty in low-exposure
states highlights the importance of controlling for initial conditions when
comparing changes in income distributions.
Panel B of ﬁgure 10.12 shows the cumulative density for wages in high-
exposure and low-exposure states in 2000, based on the characteristics of
workers in high-exposure regions in 1990. The fraction of workers earning
less than the poverty wage is 0.40 in low-exposure states and 0.22 in high-
exposure states, which again is a smaller diﬀerence (0.40 – 0.22   0.18)
than that for the actual wage distributions in ﬁgure 10.10 (0.49 – 0.22  
0.27). Putting the 1990-to-2000 change in the incidence of wage poverty for
low-exposure versus high-exposure states together yields a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimate of (0.40 – 0.32) – (0.22 – 0.21)   0.07. During Mexico’s
globalization decade of the 1990s, the incidence of wage poverty in low-
exposure states appeared to increase relative to that in high-exposure states
by approximately 7 percent.
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shows estimates of equation (2)—the 1990-to-2000 change in income den-
sities in high-exposure states—and of equation (5)—the 1990-to-2000
change in income densities in low-exposure states—where all densities are
evaluated based on the distribution of observables in high-exposure states
in 1990 (as shown in equations [3] and [7]). In low-exposure states, there
was a pronounced shift in mass from the upper half of the distribution to
the lower half of the distribution. In high-exposure states, there was a mod-
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Fig. 10.12 Counterfactual cumulative income distributions, high- and low-
exposure states: A, 1990; B, 2000est shift in mass from the upper part of the distribution to the middle of the
distribution. While labor incomes in the 1990s deteriorated in both regions,
caused in part by Mexico’s peso crisis in 1995, the deterioration was much
less severe in states with high exposure to globalization.
The change in regional relative incomes is seen more clearly in ﬁgure
10.14, which shows an estimate of equation (8), the change in income den-
sity in high-exposure states relative to the change in income density in low-
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Fig. 10.13 Estimated change in labor income densities, 1990 to 2000
Fig. 10.14 Double diﬀerence in labor income densitiesexposure states (evaluated for the distribution of observable characteris-
tics in high-exposure states in 1990). It is clear that the income of high-
exposure states has increased relative to the income of low-exposure states.
This appears as shift in mass in the double density diﬀerence from the
lower half of the distribution to the upper half of the distribution. During
Mexico’s globalization decade, individuals born in states with high expo-
sure to globalization appear to have done much better than individuals
born in states with low exposure to globalization. These results appear to
be robust to changing the sample of states with either high exposure or low
exposure to globalization. In unreported results, I experimented with
dropping high-exposure states one at a time from the sample and reesti-
mating the income densities and with dropping low-exposure states one at
a time and reestimating the densities. Both sets of results are very similar
to those reported.
10.4.3 Additional Results
Throughout the analysis, we have evaluated labor income densities ﬁx-
ing the distribution of observable characteristics to be those in states with
high exposure to globalization in 1990. This choice of the base case is ar-
bitrary and should not aﬀect the results. To examine the robustness of the
ﬁndings, ﬁgure 10.15 reestimates the double diﬀerence in income densities
in equation (8), evaluating all densities based on the distribution of ob-
servables in low-exposure states in 1990. Figure 10.15 is very similar to ﬁg-
ure 10.14, conﬁrming that the choice of base case does not matter for the
results.
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Fig. 10.15 Double diﬀerence in labor income densities (alternative base case)The income densities shown so far are for average hourly labor earnings.
If changes in wages aﬀect individual labor supply, changes in hourly labor
earnings may understate changes in total labor income. To see if this might
be the case, ﬁgure 10.16estimates the double density diﬀerence in equation
(8), evaluated in terms of total labor income rather than average hourly la-
bor income. Figure 10.16 is similar to ﬁgure 10.14, suggesting that regional
changes in the distribution of total labor income mirror regional changes
in the distribution of hourly labor income.
In the results so far, I have included the full sample of workers from low-
exposure and high-exposure states in 1990 and 2000. One concern is that
the nature of self-selection into work varies across states or across time. If
labor force participation diﬀers between low-exposure and high-exposure
states, then cross-section comparisons in wage distributions may be con-
taminated by sample selection. If these diﬀerences are stable over time,
they may not pose a problem for comparing changes in wage distributions.
However, if labor force participation changes diﬀerentially over time be-
tween low-exposure and high-exposure states, then sample selection may
also contaminate the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis. For males with nine
or more years of education, labor force participation rates are very similar
in low-exposure and high-exposure states. For low-education males, labor
force participation rates are higher in high-exposure states, and these
diﬀerences appear to increase over time. This suggests the data are missing
more low-wage workers in low-exposure states than in high-exposure
states, which would tend to compress the estimated diﬀerence in wage dis-
tributions for the two groups of states. Further, since the relative fraction
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Fig. 10.16 Double diﬀerence in total labor income densitiesof missing low-wage workers in low-exposure states rises over time, my es-
timates would tend to understate the full extent of the change in relative
wages between the two groups of states over time.
To deal with sample selection associated with labor force participation,
I apply Lee’s (2005) technique for trimming observations to make them
comparable across samples (which may vary by region, time, or some other
dimension). The idea is that if both wages and labor force participation are
monotonically increasing in the unobserved component of wages, then it
is possible to make two samples comparable in terms of the distribution of
unobservables by trimming low-wage observations in the group that has
higher labor force participation. We cannot add low-wage workers who do
not work into the sample in the low-labor-force-participation group, but
we can drop from the sample low-wage workers in the high-labor-force-
participation group (who presumably would not work if they were to be
placed in the other group). I trim low-wage workers from the high-labor-
force-participation group until I obtain two samples that are identical in
terms of the fraction of wage earners included. Figures 10.17 and 10.18
redo ﬁgures 10.13 and 10.14 applying Lee’s trimming procedure. It remains
the case that wages deteriorate by more in low-exposure states. Income in
high-exposure states increases relative to income in low-exposure states,
which appears as a shift in mass in the double density diﬀerence from the
lower half of the distribution to the upper half of the distribution. This is
further evidence that during Mexico’s globalization decade individuals
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Fig. 10.17 Estimated change in labor income densities, 1990 to 2000, with obser-
vations trimmed to account for selection into workborn in states with high exposure to globalization did relatively well in
terms of their labor earnings.
10.4.4 Parametric Results
While the nonparametric results show a strong increase in relative in-
comes in states with high exposure to globalization, they give no sense of
the statistical precision of these estimates. As a check on the statistical sig-
niﬁcance of the results, table 10.5 shows estimation results for equation
(10). The dependent variable is log average hourly labor earnings. The re-
gressors are dummy variables for educational attainment, a quadratic in
age, a dummy variable for the year 2000 and its interaction with the age and
education variables, a dummy variable for having been born in a state with
high exposure to globalization and its interaction with the age and educa-
tion variables, dummy variables for the state, and the interaction of the
year 2000 and high-exposure-to-globalization dummy variables. This last
variable captures the diﬀerential change in wage growth in high-exposure
states relative to low-exposure states. Standard errors are adjusted for cor-
relation across observations within the same state.
Panel A of table 10.5 shows that during the 1990s the cohort of individ-
uals born in states with high exposure to globalization enjoyed labor earn-
ings growth that was 7.9 to 9.2 log points higher than earnings growth for
individuals born in low-exposure states. These coeﬃcients are precisely es-
timated. This is consistent with the counterfactual density estimates and
again suggests that individuals in high-exposure states enjoyed higher
growth in labor income that individuals in low-exposure states. The second
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Fig. 10.18 Double diﬀerence in labor income densities, with observations trimmed
to account for selection into worktwo columns of table 10.5 show results where the year 2000/high-exposure
interaction is interacted with a dummy variable for an individual having
completed a secondary education. This term allows relative earnings
growth to be larger for more-educated workers. The interaction term is
negative, but imprecisely estimated.
Panel B of table 10.5 redoes the estimation, trimming observations
across the samples to account for possible self-selection into work. Esti-
mated relative wage growth for high-exposure states is higher using this es-
timation method, with individuals born in high-exposure states enjoying
labor earnings growth 9.0 to 10.9 log points higher than that of individuals
born in low-exposure states. In the second two columns, the interaction be-
tween the year 2000/high-exposure interaction and the dummy variable
for secondary education is negative, precisely estimated, and similar in ab-
solute value to the main eﬀect (the year 2000/high-exposure interaction).
This suggests that on average most of the relative wage growth for individ-
uals born in high-exposure states went to individuals with low levels of
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Table 10.5 Regression results
Workers with  Workers with 
All  20- to 80-hour  All  20- to 80-hour 
workers work week workers work week
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Full sample of workers
Year 2000   high exposure 0.092 0.079 0.115 0.116
(0.039) (0.033) (0.053) (0.050)
Year 2000   high exposure  –0.050 –0.079
  secondary education (0.042) (0.046)
R2 0.337 0.373 0.337 0.373
No. of observations 45,012 42,298 45,012 42,298
B. Trimmed sample to account for sample selection
Year 2000   high exposure 0.109 0.090 0.159 0.153
(0.029) (0.025) (0.040) (0.039)
Year 2000   high exposure  –0.106 –0.130
  secondary education (0.031) (0.034)
R2 0.380 0.417 0.380 0.418
No. of observations 42,711 40,224 42,711 40,224
Notes: The dependent variable is log average hourly labor earnings. In columns (1) and (3), the sample
is non-self-employed males born in states with high exposure to globalization or states with low expo-
sure to globalization; in columns (2) and (4), the sample includes only the non-self-employed who report
working twenty to eighty hours a week. Other regressors (quadratic in age, dummies for year of educa-
tion, and their interactions with year 2000 dummy and with high exposure dummy; year 2000 dummy
variable; state dummy variables) are not shown. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for
correlation across observations within birth states. In panel A, the sample is working males in all states
and time periods; in panel B, I trim low-wage workers in high-labor-force-participation state/year groups
until the fraction of wage earners is the same in low-exposure and high-exposure states and in the two
years.schooling. The income gains in moving from low-exposure to high-
exposure states appear to be largest for low-wage workers.
10.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the change in the distribution of labor income
across regions of Mexico during the country’s decade of globalization, the
1990s. I focus the analysis on men born either in states with high exposure
to globalization or in states with low exposure to globalization, as mea-
sured by the share of FDI, imports, and export assembly in state GDP dur-
ing the 1990s. Mexican states with high exposure to globalization are lo-
cated along the U.S. border and in the relatively skill-abundant center-west
region of the country; states with low exposure to globalization are prima-
rily located in more rural southern Mexico. I exclude from the analysis in-
dividuals born in states with intermediate exposure to globalization.
Controlling for regional diﬀerences in the distribution of observable
characteristics and for initial diﬀerences in regional incomes, the distribu-
tion of labor income in high-exposure states shifted to the right relative to
the distribution of income in low-exposure states. This change in regional
relative incomes was the result of a shift in mass in the income distribution
of low-exposure states from upper-middle income earners to lower income
earners. Labor income in low-exposure states fell relative to high-exposure
states by 8–12 percent, and the incidence of wage poverty (the fraction of
wage earners whose labor income would not sustain a family of four at
above-poverty consumption levels) increased in low-exposure states rela-
tive to high-exposure states by 7 percent.
There are several possible interpretations of these results. One is that
trade and investment liberalization raised incomes in states with high ex-
posure to the global economy relative to states with low exposure to the
global economy. However, trade and investment reforms were by no means
the only shocks to the Mexican economy during the 1990s. The Mexican
peso crisis in 1995 was another important event. The results are also con-
sistent with the greater ability of states that were more integrated into the
global markets to weather the large devaluation of the peso, the banking
crisis, and the contraction in economic activity that occurred in Mexico
during the mid-1990s. High-exposure states are relatively specialized in ex-
port production and would potentially beneﬁt from a depreciation of the
currency.
Other policy changes, such as the privatization and deregulation of Mex-
ican industry or the reform of Mexico’s land-tenure system, may also have
had diﬀerential regional impacts in Mexico. Privatization and deregulation
appeared to weaken Mexico’s unions and lower wage premiums enjoyed by
workers in these sectors (Fairris 2003). Since more heavily unionized in-
Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico 449dustries are concentrated in Mexico’s north and center, and relatively ab-
sent in Mexico’s south (Chiquiar 2003), we might expect a loss in union
power to lower relative incomes in states with higher exposure to global-
ization, contrary to what we observe in the data. The reform of Mexico’s
land-tenure system allowed individuals to sell agricultural land previously
held in cooperative ownership. In principle we might expect this opportu-
nity to raise relative incomes in rural southern Mexico, where agriculture
accounts for a relatively high share of employment and output. Again, this
is contrary to what we observe in the data.
Another possibility is that income growth in high-exposure states merely
reﬂects continuing trends unrelated to globalization. This also does not
appear to be the case. As seen in ﬁgure 10.6, poorer states, which include
seven of the ten states with low exposure to globalization, had faster
growth in per capita income than richer states, which include six of the
seven high-exposure states. The process of income convergence in Mexico
came to a halt in 1985, coinciding with the onset of trade liberalization.
Since 1985, regional incomes have diverged in the country. The pattern of
income growth I uncover does not appear to have been evident in the early
1980s or before.
A brief review of Mexico’s other policy reforms during the 1990s does
not suggest any obvious reason why they should account for the observed
increase in relative incomes in states with high exposure to globalization.
Still, it is important to be cautious about ascribing shifts in regional rela-
tive incomes to speciﬁc policy changes. In the end, we can only say that I
ﬁnd suggestive evidence that globalization has increased relative incomes
in Mexican states that are more exposed to global markets.
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Comment Esther Duﬂo
Relative to the abundant number of papers on the impact of globalization
on inequality, only a few papers (several of them in this volume) try to in-
vestigate its eﬀects on poverty. This is unfortunate, since the eﬀects on
poverty are at the heart of the debate between proglobalization and anti-
globalization camps, with each employing theoretical reasoning and anec-
dotal evidence to argue that globalization is good (or bad) for the poor.
The present paper is part of a most welcome change in this state of
aﬀairs. Hanson examines the impact of globalization on the shape of wage
distribution in Mexico and, in particular, on the number of people whose
wages would place them below the poverty line if they were to subsist on
these wages. While this is not the whole story on poverty (some of the poor
may be unemployed or self-employed, for example), this is clearly an es-
sential ingredient. Moreover, data on wages are available from a large
sample and are representative at the regional level, which is not the case for
consumption data. In future work, it may be possible to use these data to
attempt to say something about poverty, using the strategy developed by
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tional Bureau of Economic Research.Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003), for instance. Their strategy involves
using a smaller data set containing both wages and consumption informa-
tion to predict the relationship between poverty, wages, and other variables
observed in the larger data set. Using this strategy as a foundation, one
could construct an estimate of poverty at the regional level using the rep-
resentative data set, and then use this as the dependent variable in the anal-
ysis.
Hanson’s approach is to compare the evolution of wage distribution dur-
ing the “decade of globalization” (1990–2000) in regions that were most
exposed to globalization to that of regions that were less exposed to glob-
alization. (Globalization is deﬁned as a composite index, reﬂecting expo-
sure to FDI and foreign trades.) He shows that the distribution of wages
shifted to the right in exposed states between 1990 and 2000, relative to the
distribution in unexposed states. The states with higher exposure were al-
ready richer in 1990, but they were even richer by 2000. In particular, the
number of wage-poor in states with high exposure declined by 10 percent
relative to the number in unexposed states. Globalization appears to have
beneﬁted more the states that were exposed to it most.
Hanson takes great care to ensure the robustness of these ﬁndings: he de-
ﬁnes a person’s region as his state of birth, in order to ensure that he is not
picking up the eﬀect of migration by high-ability migrants to the regions
with more opportunities. He shows that before 1990, there tended to be a
convergence between Mexican states, so that the eﬀect found between 1990
and 2000 is not prima facie likely to be due to the continuation of a diver-
gence trend. Some uncertainty is bound to remain: the convergence trend
is established over a long period, and so is the result found in this paper. It
is possible that the richer states would have started to diverge anyway, and
that this is what is reﬂected in these results. Several serious shocks aﬀected
Mexico during this decade, and they could have had diﬀerential eﬀects on
diﬀerent regions, varying systematically with their exposure to foreign in-
vestment and trade. It is diﬃcult to assess in which direction these eﬀects
would have gone. The results are therefore far from deﬁnitive, but they
should certainly aﬀect our priors that the globalization in Mexico reduced
poverty more (or increased poverty less) in regions that were more exposed
to foreign investment and foreign trade.
One must be cautious in interpreting the results as saying that global-
ization was good for Mexico’s poor, however. The strategy involves a com-
parison between regions and would not pick up any macroeconomic eﬀect
aﬀecting Mexico as a whole. Mexico is an integrated economy, and the re-
gions share a number of characteristics. These eﬀects could go in either di-
rection. For example, some may argue that the peso crisis was a conse-
quence of globalization. If it made everyone poorer, this would not be
picked up by the approach. This strategy can only tell us whether some re-
gions pick up more of the beneﬁts (or less of the burden) of globalization
Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico 453than others, and whether this is related to how much more they were ex-
posed to trade. This is an important question, and it has the advantage over
the more general question (what was the impact of globalization on pov-
erty in Mexico) in that it can be answered.
It is important to note that if the Mexican labor market was fully inte-
grated, migration would operate to equalize factor prices, and there would
be no diﬀerential impact of globalization on diﬀerent regions. Hanson’s
paper therefore tells us that labor is relatively immobile across regions. In
contrast, within regions, it seems to be mobile across sectors (employment
in the maquiladoras, for example). A comparison between this paper and
two other contributions in this volume (chap. 7, by Topalova, on India, and
chap. 6, by Goldberg and Pavcnik, on Colombia) suggests that the extent
of labor mobility may be at the heart of the impact of globalization on
poverty, within and across regions. The chapters by Topalova and by Gold-
berg and Pavcnik both show that trade liberalization increased poverty in
the regions (Topalova) and sectors (Goldberg and Pavcnik) it directly
aﬀected, relative to those that were less aﬀected.1 In both cases, in contrast
to what Hanson ﬁnds in this paper, the mobility of labor seems to have been
very limited, both across sectors and across regions. In turn, the mobility
of labor may have been hindered by the absence of reallocation of capital
across sectors.
These papers taken together seem to suggest that factor mobility may be
at the heart of the impact of trade on poverty. A generation of new models
(notably Banerjee and Newman 2004) focuses on developing the theory of
trade with imperfect factor mobility. We can hope that these models will be
followed by a new wave of empirical work explicitly testing some of these
hypotheses.
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